PYONGYANG, North Korea — Officially, we now are only
hours from North Korea's launch of its Kwangmyongsong-3
satellite. The first of four reserved daily launch windows has
already passed, with three to go until Monday.
hours from North Korea's launch of its Kwangmyongsong-3
satellite. The first of four reserved daily launch windows has
already passed, with three to go until Monday.
Celebrations are already planned that involve a successful mission
. The radio beacon is to transmit hymns in honor of the country’s
ruling dynasty. Foreign displeasure of the demonstration of rocket
prowess will be ignored.
. The radio beacon is to transmit hymns in honor of the country’s
ruling dynasty. Foreign displeasure of the demonstration of rocket
prowess will be ignored.
All that is planned — if the launch works. But what if it doesn’t?
What if the Earth-observing satellite goes the way its two predecessors
apparently did — into the ocean, as scorched shrapnel, following a
launch failure?
What if the Earth-observing satellite goes the way its two predecessors
apparently did — into the ocean, as scorched shrapnel, following a
launch failure?
This is worth serious consideration, since the things I’ve seen and assessed
during our amazing insider tour of the North Korean space program have
made me a lot more worried about the likelihood of this launch succeeding.
NBC's space expert answers your questionsduring our amazing insider tour of the North Korean space program have
made me a lot more worried about the likelihood of this launch succeeding.
Kinds of failures A lot will depend on just how and when the failure occurs.
In the first moments of flight, as the rocket lifts off the pad at the new
Sohae launch base , it could explode, as early rockets in many other countries
did.
Sohae launch base , it could explode, as early rockets in many other countries
did.
But this may not be as easily detectable as it seems, especially if the video transmission from the launch site has been tape-delayed in prudent
anticipation of exactly such a possibility. In that case, "no news" is all
the news there will be, until a later announcement that the launch has been "indefinitely postponed."
anticipation of exactly such a possibility. In that case, "no news" is all
the news there will be, until a later announcement that the launch has been "indefinitely postponed."
Local residents north of the base — and we saw lots of villages
there — would notice the explosion, but might not even connect it
with a rocket. And rumors would be unlikely to spread very fast in
such a tightly controlled society.
there — would notice the explosion, but might not even connect it
with a rocket. And rumors would be unlikely to spread very fast in
such a tightly controlled society.
After a minute or so of flight, the rocket will be high in the skies over
the western half of the country, including the capital, Pyongyang.
Any "energetic event" (NASA’s favorite euphemism for a bad-ass
explosion) could streak the sky with a burst of flame — but no sound.
the western half of the country, including the capital, Pyongyang.
Any "energetic event" (NASA’s favorite euphemism for a bad-ass
explosion) could streak the sky with a burst of flame — but no sound.
Lots of people would see it, and some foreign visitors might even
get a picture. But these photographs and videos would be recognized
for what they showed only if the launch was announced within a minute
of liftoff.
get a picture. But these photographs and videos would be recognized
for what they showed only if the launch was announced within a minute
of liftoff.
These possibilities underscore the importance of the North Koreans
announcing the launch time in advance, and broadcasting the launch
video with minimum delay — or all their vaunted "transparency" involved
with the unprecedented press tour evaporates.
announcing the launch time in advance, and broadcasting the launch
video with minimum delay — or all their vaunted "transparency" involved
with the unprecedented press tour evaporates.
Out of sight, out of luck Another opportunity for failure would come
after a well-publicized liftoff, after the vehicle vanishes over the southern
horizon. The critical third-stage burn, which apparently involves a
fairly sophisticated sideways jog to slip into the proper final orbit,
may be too far away for in-country tracking sites to receive signals
. So instead they have to wait.
after a well-publicized liftoff, after the vehicle vanishes over the southern
horizon. The critical third-stage burn, which apparently involves a
fairly sophisticated sideways jog to slip into the proper final orbit,
may be too far away for in-country tracking sites to receive signals
. So instead they have to wait.
During all this time, officials say, the satellite will be transmitting patriotic hymns on a 470MHz beacon. Foreign radio listeners will try to pick it up, and if the satellite reaches orbit, it’s almost certain that some — perhaps very, very many — will do so before the first official North Korean reception.The wait could be excruciating, because the satellite’s orbit does not pass within radio range of North Korea for 11 hours. This is a real situation — I’ve checked the orbital flight path myself — and it’s caused by the steep polar orbit of the vehicle.
If nobody hears the satellite’s beacon in those hours, something
clearly will have gone wrong.
clearly will have gone wrong.
Observers also need to be cautious about inevitable rumors and
"false positives" — possible confirmatory signals picked up briefly
or weakly, that actually originated with our unrelated transmitters.
This happens often enough to mislead observers to eager to find
and trumpet a "first signal," so we need to be cautious.
"false positives" — possible confirmatory signals picked up briefly
or weakly, that actually originated with our unrelated transmitters.
This happens often enough to mislead observers to eager to find
and trumpet a "first signal," so we need to be cautious.
Failure is an option Failures in space often occur because,
basically, "space is hard." And it’s especially hard on beginners.
Failure rates in almost every national program start out high, and
then diminish.
basically, "space is hard." And it’s especially hard on beginners.
Failure rates in almost every national program start out high, and
then diminish.
But people can also make spaceflight harder than it has to be through
careless and imprudent attitudes. These can interfere with the crucial
process of error detection, diagnosis and correction, that must occur
effectively many times a day in the run-up to a space shot.
careless and imprudent attitudes. These can interfere with the crucial
process of error detection, diagnosis and correction, that must occur
effectively many times a day in the run-up to a space shot.
If people are pressured into cutting corners and taking shortcuts to meet
an unrealistic schedule, critical choices may be overlooked, crucial repairs may be omitted. Lamentable examples from the past are too numerous and well-known to merit mentioning.
an unrealistic schedule, critical choices may be overlooked, crucial repairs may be omitted. Lamentable examples from the past are too numerous and well-known to merit mentioning.
And the schedule pressure on this North Korean mission, tied to the
most important holiday in their country’s history, must be immense.
It’s a formula for fatal errors, all too familiar to space experts.
most important holiday in their country’s history, must be immense.
It’s a formula for fatal errors, all too familiar to space experts.
The North Korean situation is made worse by the "launch fever" attitude
exemplified by mission managers in front of visiting Western journalists.
With quasi-religious fervor and dedication to an ideology they treat as
near-divine, their ability to tolerate dissent or doubts from working troops
must be very, very low. When in doubt, it seems, they quote favorite
passages from their leaders’ writings, and charge ahead.
exemplified by mission managers in front of visiting Western journalists.
With quasi-religious fervor and dedication to an ideology they treat as
near-divine, their ability to tolerate dissent or doubts from working troops
must be very, very low. When in doubt, it seems, they quote favorite
passages from their leaders’ writings, and charge ahead.
This is more than worrisome: It seems to be a recipe for disaster. Every
worker must have the courage to speak up and recommend remedial
measures. Whether they can overcome this culture in a technological
field that is notoriously intolerant of make-believe is the most serious
issue I found on my visit.
worker must have the courage to speak up and recommend remedial
measures. Whether they can overcome this culture in a technological
field that is notoriously intolerant of make-believe is the most serious
issue I found on my visit.
Mythical reasons If the mission does fail, there are a wide variety of
excuses available to all observers to "explain it away." And since rocket
scientists know that the first step towards one’snext disaster is to forget
about — or deny — the previous disaster, the North Korean insistence
against all evidence that their first two satellites were actually successful,
is not auspicious.
excuses available to all observers to "explain it away." And since rocket
scientists know that the first step towards one’snext disaster is to forget
about — or deny — the previous disaster, the North Korean insistence
against all evidence that their first two satellites were actually successful,
is not auspicious.
The first and most traditional reaction from Pyongyang to a satellite
failure would be simply to pretend it succeeded. That worked for them
in 1998 and 2009, but this time there is too much scrutiny from visitors
and worldwide radio amateurs to make such a pretense attractive.
failure would be simply to pretend it succeeded. That worked for them
in 1998 and 2009, but this time there is too much scrutiny from visitors
and worldwide radio amateurs to make such a pretense attractive.
The next choice, however, is worse: Blame foreign enemies. If the
failure occurred early in flight, the South Koreans can be implicated.
If it occurs farther away, out of radio contact, U.S. malevolence is an
obvious scapegoat. This is an instinct that we even saw in some
supposedly sensible Russian space experts when their recent Mars
probe tripped on its face just out of the starting gate. U.S. radar interference
was widely suggested as the cause, a gimmick that North Korea could be
expected to copy for its own needs.
failure occurred early in flight, the South Koreans can be implicated.
If it occurs farther away, out of radio contact, U.S. malevolence is an
obvious scapegoat. This is an instinct that we even saw in some
supposedly sensible Russian space experts when their recent Mars
probe tripped on its face just out of the starting gate. U.S. radar interference
was widely suggested as the cause, a gimmick that North Korea could be
expected to copy for its own needs.
for its own needs.
Alternately, Pyongyang could blame internal enemies intent on sabotage, an old Stalin-era trick. It could help fuel a major purge of less-than-perfectly-loyal officials during the ongoing regime transition. Hundreds could be fired, and many shot — a convenient excuse for a housecleaning.
Russia came up with a less malicious blame-shifting gambit recently when they officially explained the crash of the Mars-bound Phobos-Grunt probe on what today passes for an "act of God" — space radiation. Supposedly, two computer chips were zapped by cosmic forces beyond the control of mere earthlings. If the North Koreans are feeling unusually benign, they could opt for this excuse, and reduce the need for much bloodletting.
Western conspiracy theory No catalog of conspiracy theories would be complete without a version that might spring up in the West — that the failure was all part of a preordained plan to hide a top-secret weapons test. Like all good conspiracy theories, it originates from a web of actual facts, but then lets the imagination guide the conclusions.
Here’s one version: the "satellite" was never on board, but had been surreptitiously replaced by the one major missile weapon component not yet verified, a heat-shielded re-entry capsule. Until this technology is acquired, the ability to throw a warhead thousands of miles is useless, because the descending warhead would burn up as soon as it hits the atmosphere.
So to close this gap, put a test warhead under the nose cone. Launch it as a "satellite." Let the warhead drop back into the atmosphere along with the spent second stage, where it can radio simple test results to a small ship or submarine. Physical recovery wouldn’t be necessary to confirm that the design worked.
All these excuses have the virtue of being simple and easy to understand. Their only drawback, aside from the aggravation of already-too-high tensions in the area, is that they would be wrong — and worse than useless in preparing for a new launch attempt.